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Water rights: a comparison of the impacts of 
urban and irrigation reforms in Australia
 




Although there has been a policy thrust towards making all Australians more cognisant
of the relative scarcity of water resources, the approach adopted for urban dwellers
differs markedly from that applied to irrigators. These differences are examined from
a property-rights perspective focussing primarily on the institutional hierarchies in the
Victorian water sector. The analysis reveals signiﬁcant attenuation of urban dwellers’
rights, presumably on the basis of the information deﬁciencies that circumscribe urban
water use.  Alternative policy options are then proposed, which might alleviate some
of these information deﬁciencies and simultaneously address the efﬁciency losses that








Australia’s urban water users are being asked to modify their behaviour to
take greater account of the relative scarcity of the resource (see, for instance,
DSE 2004). At the policy level, the tenor of the recently announced National
Water Initiative (NWI) and the accompanying state responses have brought
the water-related activities of urban communities sharply into focus. It might
be argued that the heightened attention currently given to the behaviour of urban
users is disproportionate to the extent of their extractive use. Nevertheless,
given the powerful political inﬂuence of urban voters and the apparent
determination of governments to see that the costs of any redistribution away
from historical allocations is shared across all sectors (see, for instance,
Anderson 2005; Bracks in DSE 2004, p. 5), the behaviour of urban water
users is likely to attract continued scrutiny in the medium term.
Policy-makers have responded to the challenge of altering the demand for
urban water in two ways. First, there has been a predilection to impose sanctions
and restrictions on those activities deemed to be ‘wasteful’. For instance, in
Victoria, by-laws have been enacted to prevent hosing of hard surfaces, watering
gardens in the middle of the day and hosing vehicles without trigger nozzles.
Similarly, in New South Wales the BASIX regime has imposed mandated water
savings in new housing construction. The second policy thrust has sought to
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the reluctance of policy-makers to employ con-
ventional price and trade mechanisms to adjust urban behaviour has attracted
criticism. Edwards (2005) observed that the prohibition on particular water-use
activities in urban environments challenges the efﬁciency criterion with which
economists are familiar. Similarly, Crase and Dollery (2005) have raised con-
cerns about the differing policy perspectives employed to encourage reform
in urban versus irrigation contexts. These apparent inconsistencies raise
serious questions about the overall efﬁcacy of water policy.
To better understand the incongruously different policy approaches to urban
water users and irrigators, the contrasting property rights regimes in each sector
are explored. By doing so we hope to expose the source of potential deﬁcien-
cies in the current arrangements, particularly in the urban water sector, and
identify alternative policy approaches that deserve serious investigation.
This paper is organised into ﬁve main parts. In Section 2 the elements of water
property rights are considered and the notion of attenuation expanded to deal
with a range of property-right characteristics. Section 3 explores the notion of
institutional hierarchies or ‘nested’ institutions (Ostrom 1990, pp. 50–51).
Both of these concepts are used to consider the extant property rights in urban
and irrigation settings in Australia in Section 4. This section also brieﬂy con-
siders the information and policy implications of this comparison. Possible
policy alternatives to improve the ﬂow of information to urban water users are




A useful framework for considering property rights involves conceptualising
them as a collection of entitlements over a resource rather than ‘ownership
of property’ per se. In this context, a property right is more concerned with
the relationships among individuals than with the relationship between indi-
viduals and objects of value (Bromley 1989, pp. 202–203). Put differently,
property rights are more about the rights of individuals to impose restriction
on the behaviour of others than they are about the ‘ownership’ of a resource.
A number of different deﬁnitions of property rights have been proposed in
the literature (see, for example, Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 2000). In
this instance, we follow the diagrammatic representation developed by Scott
(1989) that was later employed by Challen (2000, pp. 71–73) to depict the
property rights of various irrigators in Australia. The framework developed
by Scott (1989) describes property rights in six main dimensions. First, exclu-
sivity describes the extent to which others can be prevented from accessing
the item/resource or enjoying the beneﬁts that ﬂow from it. Second, duration
is used to represent the period of the rights. Third, the ease with which a
right may be passed to others is encapsulated in the transferability dimen-
sion. Fourth, divisibility endeavours to depict the degree to which the right
can be subdivided. Fifth, the extent to which the right permits an alteration
to the pattern of use is deﬁned as ﬂexibility. Finally, the quality of title 
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attribute encompasses the capacity of the title to adequately describe the
resource or item, enumerate penalties for violation, and specify the rights and
duties of right-holders and others.
If we conceptualise rights as the ‘power over the behaviour of others’, non-
attenuation implies that the discretionary behaviour of the right-holder is
near absolute. For example, non-attenuated ‘ﬂexibility’ of a water right would
imply that the right-holder can alter the pattern of usage without regard to
the impacts on others. Placing attenuation on the ‘ﬂexibility’ of rights might
limit the extent to which right-holders can modify usage.
Urban water use has been signiﬁcantly attenuated by the various water by-
laws and bureaucratic restraints on consumptive use in urban environments.
Thus, one of the interesting conundrums in the context of urban water is the
observation by Quiggin (1986, p. 106) that the attenuation of rights reduces
the value to the owner and ‘this is particularly true when attenuation is the
result of actions by governments, such as regulatory limits on the way in
which property may be used or restrictions on the sale and purchase of prop-
erty.’ The present policies stand in stark contrast to the stated goal of water
reform in some states, which purportedly seeks to ‘change the way we use
and value water’ (Bracks in DSE 2004, p. 5).
 
3. Institutional hierarchies and water rights
 
We observed earlier that property rights could be more appropriately deﬁned
in terms of their capacity to impinge on the behaviour of others: non-attenuated
rights imply absolute discretion on the part of the right-holder to conﬁne the
behaviour of others in relation to the resource or item. Thus the reciprocity of
rights becomes apparent. For instance, take the attenuation of the ‘exclusivity’
element of water which implies that others would have strong claims over the
usage patterns adopted by right-holders. This might represent the present
case for urban water users, who have relatively little ﬂexibility by virtue of
the regulations that prohibit particular consumptive uses. Prima facie, these
arrangements might be considered to offer greater ‘exclusivity’ at the com-
munal level, in the form of an urban water authority. In this situation, the
individual household’s exclusivity rights are severely attenuated while the
group’s rights (e.g. the water authority) become less attenuated.
However, the rights of an urban water authority cannot be considered without
reference to the property rights of the state as a superordinate institution with
potentially stronger claims. For example, the state can just as easily amend the
rights of an urban water authority by imposing compulsory state-wide water
saving targets. The point is that little headway can be made by considering
the rights assigned at a single level. It is more instructive to consider rights as
hierarchies where a single resource has multiple right-holders and attenuation
varies along each property right element at each level. Moreover, ‘the hierarchy
comprises a system of nested rules where each successive level is legally supported
and maintained by the superordinate level’ (Challen 2000, pp. 24–25). A 
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simpliﬁed conceptualisation of an institutional hierarchy applying to a par-
ticular instance in urban and irrigation settings is depicted in Figure 1.
This is not the only hierarchical conﬁguration possible and is most
applicable in the case of Victorian water institutions. For instance, riparian
irrigators may draw surface water directly from rivers and are therefore not
subject to a superordinate institution, like an irrigation district.
If we accept this hierarchical conceptualisation of right-holders and recog-
nise that there are interdependencies between the degree of attenuation at
each level, an important question emerges: what is the appropriate amount of
attenuation that should be applied at each level of the hierarchy? Put differ-
ently, what is the appropriate property rights regime at each level for urban
and irrigation sectors?
According to Challen (2000, p. 28) ‘the central issue in examining alterna-
tive institutional structures [which include property rights regimes] is that of
transaction costs.’ Although an extensive review of the published work on
transaction costs is beyond the scope of this paper, sufﬁce to say a relatively
broad interpretation of the notion of transaction cost is employed here. In
the current context they are taken to encompass the ‘costs incurred in organ-
ising and coordinating human interaction’ (Challen 2000, p. 28). Challen
contends that property rights themselves emerge in an effort to curtail the
transaction costs of exchange (2000, p. 29). However, costs are also incurred
in the development of property right regimes and the enforcement thereof.
Figure 1 Institutional hierarchy for a set of urban and irrigation water users in Victoria.
Source: Adapted from Challen (2000, p. 64). 
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Thus, when considering the efﬁcient level of rights attenuation within a hier-
archy, the problem reduces to discerning the property rights structure that
embodies the lowest aggregate transaction costs. Put differently, ‘[t]he choice
between alternative property-right regimes can be considered a problem of
minimising transaction costs associated with the making of decisions over
the use of resources’ (Challen 2000, p. 31).
In addition to considering transaction costs in this way, it is important to
understand the relationship between information and transaction costs. A
body of published work has emerged from the concept of bounded rational-
ity that seeks to precisely describe the information problems that form the
foundation of behavioural uncertainty which, in turn, underpins the cost of
organising and coordinating human behaviour, that is, transaction costs (see,
for instance, Langlois 1984; Davidson 1991). In essence, this work indicates
that the level of transaction costs is directly related to the imperfections
attendant on a piece of information.
By way of illustration, consider the information that would be required to
assess the value that urban users might place on different types of consump-
tive use and then distribute that resource in line with those preferences. In
this case one of the advantages of a market framework with exclusive indi-
vidual rights is that individuals are best equipped to rank their preferred
activities and decide if beneﬁts exceed costs. Moreover, to accomplish the
same task at a higher level in the institutional hierarchy, say at the level of an
urban water authority, would entail signiﬁcant search costs on the part of the
authority. Only when the information about users’ preferences is perfect and
cheaply available will the authority be able to replicate the low-transaction-
cost outcome of individual choice in this context. Since omniscient water
authorities are rare, the cost of undertaking this task at a level higher than
the individual will nearly always be greater.
However, the corollary of this argument is that an urban water authority
may have access to other information at lower cost than the individual. For
instance, the authority may be better equipped to estimate future demand
and the impact of current withdrawals on all other users over time. Thus, the
attenuation of exclusivity rights for individuals might accord with lower
transaction costs if the urban water authority is able to accurately encapsu-
late these wider issues at lower cost than is the individual. The upshot of this
analysis is that the choice of one property rights regime over another can be
reduced to a lower level of analysis than that which focuses on transaction
costs. The question becomes one of the precision of information and the
capacity to interpret and act on that information.
 
4. Comparing the property right characteristics of urban and irrigation 
hierarchies
 
As a way of operationalising the property rights hierarchical framework and
the decompositional approach developed earlier, we return to the model 
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developed by Scott (1989), which diagrammatically unbundles rights into six
main elements. The purpose of this exercise is to provide an overview of the
extent of attenuation and distribution of rights to water resource users within
the different sectors. To simplify analysis, the technique used here focuses pri-
marily on the two lowest levels in the existing hierarchies in each sector. In
addition, the analysis is reduced to focusing primarily on the institutional
arrangements in Victoria, dealing only with irrigators who hold group en-
titlements (as deﬁned by Challen 2000, pp. 72–71) and conventional urban
households who purchase water directly from an urban authority. While no
consistent metric is used to measure attenuation, points closer to the end of
each axis symbolise less attenuation. A comparison of each of the sectors
using Scott’s framework (1989) is provided in Figure 2. For convenience, an
explanation of the positioning of each attribute is summarised in Table 1.
Figure 2 and Table 1 provides an interesting contrast of the distribution
and attenuation of various rights at the group and individual levels in urban
and irrigation sectors. On every front, the rights of individual urban water
users are attenuated relative to the rights enjoyed by the superordinate insti-
tution, i.e. the urban water authority. By contrast, the individual rights
assigned to irrigators are less attenuated on most dimensions when compared
to those ascribed to the group irrigation institution. As we saw, this state of
affairs may be justiﬁed on the basis of transaction costs and the distribution
of information at the various levels of the hierarchy in each sector. However,
as we observed earlier the question of institutional efﬁciency centres on the
effectiveness with which each level of the institutional hierarchy accesses and
then acts upon that information.













































































































































An explanation of the level of attenuation of individual and group rights in irrigation and urban water use
Property rights 
attribute
Irrigation sector Urban sector
Group Individual Group Individual
Flexibility Water resources can be 
redistributed to any use 
(subject to the constraints 
of historical supply 
commitments).
Choice of enterprise largely 
resides with the irrigator, 
although the group can 
inﬂuence some decision, like 
choice of irrigation technique.
Water resources can be 
redistributed to any use 
(subject to the constraints 
of historical supply 
commitments).
There is some scope to 
amend internal household
use. Outdoor activities 
are heavily attenuated.
Exclusivity Bulk entitlements are deﬁned 
in terms of the quantity of 
available annual water although 
legislation can be enacted to take 
water for other uses without an 
obligation to offer group 
compensation (e.g. 
decommissioning Lake Mokoan).
Entitlements are deﬁned in 
terms of the quantity of 
available annual water rather 
than being attenuated by 
the actions of other users. 
Compensation applies if 
water is taken within the 
duration of rights.
Bulk entitlements are deﬁned in 
terms of the available annual 
water and are subject to the 
conditions of stream ﬂow 
management plans and the like. 
Aspirational water saving 
targets are likely to be imposed 
by superordinate institutions.
Entitlements are subject 
to storage levels reaching
‘triggers’ which activate 
quantity restrictions. 
These are also subject to 
bureaucratic intervention
and/or suasion.
Quality of Title Rights and obligations speciﬁed 
by legislation, licence conditions 
and the like.
Rights and obligations 
speciﬁed by legislation, 
licence conditions and 
the like.
Rights and obligations 
speciﬁed by legislation, 
licence conditions and 
the like.
Rights and obligations 
are speciﬁed in customer 
charters. Redress available
through VCAAT.
Transferability Theoretically, it is possible for 
an irrigation group to transfer 
bulk entitlement to others. In 
practice this right is attenuated 
by the relative scarcity of 
water and the exclusivity 
of subordinates.
Individual entitlements can 
be transferred temporarily 
or permanently, subject to 
some attenuation by the group 
(e.g. proposed exit fees).
Urban water authorities can 
transfer water between sectors 
and locations. The proposed 
legislation limits non-irrigator 
participation in the water market 
to a maximum of 10 per cent 
of entitlement.
Households cannot 
transfer water to others.
Divisibility As with transferability, this is 
theoretically possible but 
practically constrained by the 
rights assigned at the 
subordinate level.
Generally any portion can 
be transferred, although 
there may be some minimum 
transfer rules imposed.
Urban authorities can subdivide 
interconnected entitlements 
and move them to areas 
of greatest demand (within 
the limits of stream ﬂow 
management plans and the like).
Households cannot 
divide their rights and 
transfer water to others.
Duration Entitlements are subject to 
periodic review.
Entitlements are subject to 
periodic review.
Entitlements are subject to 
periodic review.
Access charges provide 
annual rights at best. 
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To  illustrate this point, we brieﬂy return to considering the contentious
imposition of ‘smart water by-laws’ enacted in Victoria, which prohibit par-
ticular urban activities by households. We have argued that these constraints
represent an attenuation of the exclusivity attribute of property rights since
they limit the ﬂow of beneﬁts arising from the resource. When considered in
the context of the informational requirements at each level in the institu-
tional hierarchy, these arrangements take on a different meaning. The atten-
uation of the individual’s property rights on this dimension is presumably
justiﬁed on the grounds that the information necessary for individuals to
make an efﬁcient allocation of the resource between different activities is
inadequate.
However, there are two dimensions to this information deﬁciency that
require closer scrutiny. The ﬁrst is the presumption that individuals do not
understand their own preferences. This argument is at odds with the expan-
sive theoretical and empirical published work on preference formation. The
second ground for attenuating the individual’s rights is that the individual
lacks sufﬁcient information about the preferences of others and thereby
chooses an inefﬁcient allocation of the resource by not giving regard to the
consequent impacts on others. Thus, the group’s imposition of constraints on
the property rights of the individual reﬂects the superior information avail-
able to the superordinate institution. The problem with this approach is that
it assumes that the superordinate institution has an adequate grasp of the
relationships between the water activities of different individuals and the
overall management of the urban water supply. This remains largely an
empirical question and has not been well explored. In addition, the evidence
on the efﬁciency of bureaucratic intervention in this context is not particu-
larly encouraging (see, for example, Crase and Dollery 2005; Edwards 2005).
The penchant for urban water managers to rely on quantity restrictions or
rationing, and thereby attenuate the rights of households, can also be traced
to fundamental philosophies that pervade urban water management. It is clear
from the policy debate that policy-makers are convinced that urban water
demand will continue to rise in line with population growth (see, for example,
DSE 2004). A related strand of thinking is that urban water demand will remain
relatively inelastic and, accompanied by the political costs of charging higher
prices for ‘water required for life’, water rationing is the only alternative.
However, there are serious ﬂaws to both of these propositions. First, urban
water scarcity in Australia is both a function of the distribution of rainfall
relative to population and the historical allocation of the resource to other
users. The former constraint is not easily reconciled or may require expensive
engineering solutions; the latter is dependent on the resolve of policy-makers
to encourage intersectoral trade. To date, the rhetoric of water policy that
espouses ‘moving the water to higher-value uses’ has not been matched at the
administrative and political levels where intervention continues to stall the
transfer of the resource from irrigation to urban and industrial users. Put simply,
rationing at the household level is, in part, a consequence of the constraints 
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imposed on trade between irrigators and urban water authorities – water is
scarce in urban contexts partly because it has proven difﬁcult to transfer the
resource from arguably lower-value users.
Second, the link between population growth and urban water demand is
premised on modest or nil behavioural adjustment on the part of urban users
as resource scarcity alters. Thus, the superordinate institution accesses and
interprets information about water scarcity on behalf of individuals in order
to deliver a more ‘efﬁcient’ outcome. This approach belies the role that price
plays in transmitting information to households for a range of other products
and services. The use of price as a vehicle for transmitting information to
individual urban water users has received insufﬁcient attention from a policy
perspective in Australia, and a consideration of the institutional arrangements
for setting short- and long-term prices seems overdue.
Presently, most urban water authorities are subject to periodic pricing
reviews by economic regulators. In Victoria, the Essential Services Commission
reviews the price regime of each water authority, largely on the basis of the
cost of service provision and anticipated capital expenditures to maintain or
upgrade services. The relative scarcity of urban water is encapsulated into
these prices in two forms. First, if an urban water authority is forced to pur-
chase additional water access rights (assuming it can do so without physical
constraints, political or administrative intervention), then these expenses will
be incorporated into the cost base upon which future prices are established.
Second, if additional water infrastructure is required to reduce ‘waste’ or
facilitate harvesting ‘new’ supplies, then these costs will inﬂate the regulated
price faced by households. These arrangements make no provision for
communicating to households the immediate status of the water available in
any storage. Thus, while price currently transmits some information about
the long-term availability of the resource, albeit imperfectly because of
constraints imposed on trade between sectors, this occurs at delayed intervals
of 3 to 5 years. Moreover, price signals at the household level arrive only
sporadically, in the form of quarterly or biennial water accounts, and often
with substantial delays between the consumption activity and payment.
Thus, in addition to the purported equity and political constraints of using
price signals, these temporal deﬁciencies in the price mechanism have been
used to sanction the quantity rationing adopted by superordinate urban
water authorities.
However, in their enthusiasm for quantity rationing comprising the banning
of perceived proﬂigate water uses, at least two fundamental policy alternatives
have been largely overlooked. First, little attention has been given to enhan-
cing the price signals received by urban households. To date, most interest has
centred on the level of water prices per se rather than the mechanisms
by which prices might transmit information to users. By contrast, in the
irrigation sector imaginative institutional arrangements that encourage price
revelation through temporary and permanent water trade, and efforts to
ensure that regulated bulk water prices reﬂect costs, have been lauded as 
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major reform achievements. It seems a pity that similar endeavours on the
policy and research fronts have not been applied to the urban water domain.





ments offers an alternative to rationing that targets individual water use
activities. For instance, seasonal scarcity of water could conceivably be com-
municated to households by establishing regulatory triggers at which water
authorities could adjust price. Notwithstanding that this places the onus on
regulators to garner additional information about the behaviour of house-
holds and the hydrological performance of water storages, the results would
likely embody fewer efﬁciency losses than those that attend the status quo.
However, fully ﬂexible short-run marginal cost pricing may pose some problems,
particularly if excessively high prices lead to undesirable reductions in some
water use activities. Nevertheless, these problems might be more effectively
dealt with through subsidies than by distorting the price of urban water.
The use of new technologies to provide timely price signals to household
users has not attracted serious attention in the urban water sector. In the case
of electricity, for example, some households can now closely monitor con-
sumption and cost without resorting to burdensome journeys to dimly lit





embarked on an experiment with 1300 customers where real-time informa-
tion on electricity consumption, costs and greenhouse emissions is provided
to households (Frew 2006, p. 1). No similar initiatives appear on the horizon
for water.
The second policy area ignored in the urban context is the assignment of
rights to individual urban users on a quantity basis that reﬂects the relative
scarcity of the resource. Individual irrigators’ rights are now deﬁned as a pro-
portion of water available for consumptive use and this is encapsulated in the
‘exclusivity’ dimension of rights. Irrigators thus share the risk associated with
ﬂuctuations in water availability. However, temporary and permanent trade
can redistribute risk between irrigators. By contrast, in the urban sector most
risks are borne at the superordinate level within the water authority. Historic-
ally, urban households expect that water authorities will deliver at least some
minimum quantum of water on demand and these rights simultaneously
accompanied physical connection to the urban water network. The risks that
accompany increased urban demand or reduced water inﬂows to storages are
then carried by the water authority (which usually manages those risks by
quantity rationing during water shortages).
Notwithstanding that practices of this kind add complexity to designing
marketable rights at the individual household level, the acceptability of
household quantity-based rights has not been tested. Moreover, households
may well prefer this form of ‘rationing’ to the current mechanisms that uni-
laterally impose the values of the policy-maker or water manager on the
range of activities available to the individual households. A quantity-based
urban system of rights would also provide more transparent comparisons
with other sectors. Scrutiny of the preferences of urban water users should be 
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a priority, particularly where urban and irrigation users are interconnected
and where political and administrative constraints over intersectoral trade




Water reform in Australia is attracting international interest and has been
applauded by several observers. For instance, Saleth and Dinar (2004, p. 173)
contend that ‘[t]hese [policy] changes further enhance the role of economic
instruments and market-based water allocation procedures while also
improving the physical health and sustainability of the water sector in




 (2003, p. 13) where
Australia was described as ‘the country that takes top prize for sensible water
management’. These comments relate primarily to reforms in agriculture –
progress on urban water reform is unlikely to attract similar praise.
To  illustrate these differences we decomposed the property rights of
irrigators and urban water users and showed the importance of considering
the hierarchy of institutions that inﬂuence decision-making in a particular
sector. In addition, the analysis underlined the role of transaction costs and
information deﬁciencies.
Applying this analysis to the urban and irrigation sectors in Australia
provides a stark contrast between the different assumptions that would appear
to be imposed by policy-makers. This analysis suggests that the broad accept-
ance of the current regulatory arrangements adopted in the urban sector
deserve further scrutiny. In addition, a reconsideration of the potential role
played by price and reﬁning the institutional arrangements by which price
communicates information about water scarcity would appear warranted.
Alternative formulations of quantity controls also deserve consideration.
Several important challenges accompany these tasks. At a technical level, a
more detailed understanding of urban water behaviour and its relationship to
alternative policy choices requires investigation. At the political level, gaining
acceptance for alternative policy approaches will always be problematic,
particularly given the historical allocation of the resource. However, until
completed, similar plaudits to those applied to irrigation reform cannot be
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